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Religious Education in Non-
Religious Schools: A Comparative
Study of Pakistan and Bangladesh
MATTHEW J. NELSON
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
ABSTRACT In both Pakistan and Bangladesh, most parents seek to provide their
children with a ‘hybrid’ education, combining both religious and non-religious
components (simultaneously). In Pakistan, however, the so-called ‘non-religious’ side
of this education – for example, in government and non-elite private schools – tends
to be associated with a particular understanding of religion, one that remains
persistently apprehensive about the treatment of and, in many ways, even the
acknowledgement of, religious, sectarian, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. Keeping this
in mind, scholars and policy makers with an interest in the relationship between
education and citizenship – particularly insofar as this relationship is tied to the
challenge of cultural diversity – would do well to focus more of their attention on
competing expressions of ‘religion’ in the context of (ostensibly) ‘non-religious’ schools.
Introduction
The literature regarding education in Pakistan and Bangladesh and, more
specifically, the literature relating religious education, is dominated by three
ideas, each of which deserves closer scrutiny. The first idea maintains that,
faced with an expanding range of educational options, the parents of school-
aged children are not expected to prefer the education provided in the context
of their local madrasa; instead, they are expected to ‘prefer’ the curricula
associated with ‘non-religious’ (that is, government or private) schools. The
second idea maintains that these government and private schools are, in fact,
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‘non-religious’ schools. And of course, the third, coming closer to some of the
existing literature regarding education and constructions of modern citizenship,
maintains that, more often than not, ‘religious’ education is tied to specific
patterns of religious and political ‘exclusion’ or ‘intolerance’.
Again, all three of these ideas deserve closer scrutiny. In fact, as the remain-
der of this article will explain in some detail, there are at least three ways in
which the existing literature regarding religious education in Pakistan and
Bangladesh could be (and should be) restructured.
First and foremost, the distinction between religious and non-religious edu-
cation, in which the former (religious education) tends to be associated with
local madrasas, whereas the latter (non-religious education) is tied to specific
government and private schools, is simply impossible to sustain. In fact a
closer look reveals that the ‘religious’ side of a (so-called) ‘non-religious’
government or private school education is impossible to avoid. In Pakistan,
for instance, government and private school textbooks designed to facilitate
the study of Urdu, as a language, have been shaped by an extraordinary and
persistent influx of explicitly religious content. In Bangladesh, questions of
‘community’ in the context of existing history and social science textbooks
are frequently addressed in terms of diverse expressions of ‘religious’ identity.
And of course, in both countries, religious studies (for example, Islamic
Studies) has emerged as a compulsory part of the curriculum in almost
every local school. Indeed, the terms of a modern ‘non-religious’ government
or private school education are, in many ways, unmistakably ‘religious’ terms.
Even apart from the content of existing curricula, however, there is a second
way in which the existing literature must be re-examined and, in many ways,
substantially revised. This emerges at the level of existing enrolment patterns
and, more specifically, the question of school ‘choice’. As a general rule,
parents in Pakistan and Bangladesh do not choose just one type of education
for their children – religious or non-religious. Instead, they choose both. Some
children are specifically selected for their local madrasa, even as their siblings
are sent to a local government (or private) school. But, more often than not,
each child is sent to a local maktab (mosque school) or madrasa early in
the morning before proceeding to another school for the remainder of his or
her ‘regular’ school day. A growing number of elite parents, however,
seeking to avoid a visit to the madrasa altogether, simply call the mullah
from their local madrasa to teach their children at home. In fact, a closer
look reveals that most children receive both types of education – religious
and non-religious – simultaneously (on a ‘part-time’ basis). And, more
often than not, they tend to encounter this religious/non-religious mix in
more than one local school: religious and non-religious subjects in the
context of their local madrasa; religious and non-religious subjects in the
context of their government or private school; and so on.
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In this article, the education provided in local madrasas will be set aside in
favour of a closer look at the education provided in the context of local gov-
ernment and private schools. In particular, an attempt will be made to shift the
focus away from local madrasas in order to show that, when it comes to
primary and secondary education in Pakistan and Bangladesh, ongoing
efforts to move ‘away from the local madrasa’ do not, in any way, amount
to a move away from ‘religion’.
In fact, coming to the third way in which the existing literature could be, and
should be, restructured, the challenge appears to lie in grappling with what
might be called the ‘religious’ side of a modern ‘non-religious’ education.
What is the content of this religious/non-religious education? And, ultimately,
how is this hybrid education tied to enduring questions regarding the bound-
aries of ‘community’ and the terms of modern ‘citizenship’? Knowing, as we
do, that existing curricula may be used to promote exclusionary political
objectives – including, as the public sector curricula developed by India’s
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2001 clearly reveal, exclusionary objectives
targeting specific religious communities (in this case, Indian Muslims) –
how is a modern religious/non-religious education tied to the cultivation of
specific forms of religious or political ‘intolerance’? (See Mukherjee &
Mukherjee, 2001; Hasan, 2002; for historical background, see Rudolph &
Rudolph, 1983). Do ‘non-religious’ government and private sector schools
play any part in the cultivation of ‘religious’ intolerance? And, if so, how?
Are ‘religious’ curricula inherently or inevitably ‘intolerant’?
In what follows, part one will focus on the relationship between religious
and non-religious education at the level of existing enrolment patterns (who
studies where?). Part two will take up the question of curricular content
(who studies what?), focusing, specifically, on the question of religious intol-
erance. If religious education is, to all intents and purposes, a ubiquitous
feature of the existing educational landscape – albeit, having said this, one
that emerges in many different forms – how might we begin to understand
the relationship between religious education, on the one hand, and intolerance,
on the other, in Pakistan and Bangladesh? Which schools (and, more specifi-
cally, which curricula) are associated with constructions of community-based
intolerance? Which schools/which curricula are not? These are the questions I
will take up and address below.
Who Studies Where?
For years, scholars and policy makers believed that parents in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and many other Muslim-majority countries were driven to
enrol their children in local madrasas ‘against their better judgment’. In par-
ticular, they argued that rampant poverty and the poor quality of existing
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government schools left local parents with ‘no other choice’ (see Houtsonen,
1994; see also Horvatich, 1994).
Increasingly, however, this view is being revisited (Houtsonen, 1994;
Horvatich, 1994). In fact, across the board, parents in Pakistan and Bangladesh
have been shown to favour some form of religious education for their children
– rich parents, poor parents, educated parents, illiterate parents, Sunni, Shi’a,
and so on (see Nelson, 2006). Indeed, as one report compiled by the European
Commission pointed out, with specific reference to Pakistan, ‘many rich
parents in urban areas where secular schools are easily accessible [continue
to] send their children to local madrasas’ (see Mercer et al., 2005:18).
Moreover, the report went on to explain that these parents seem to incorpor-
ate their local madrasa as just one among several different religious options,
options that include (a) religious education on a full-time (residential) basis,
(b) religious education on a full-time (non-residential) basis, (c) part-time
enrolments (morning), (d) part-time enrolments (evening), and so on. In
fact, as noted above, even those who steadfastly refuse to send their children
to a local maktab or madrasa routinely call the mullah from their local
madrasa to teach their children at home.1 And, yet, even apart from the
local mullah, the local maktab, or the local madrasa, the report explained,
most children encountered some form of religious education in the context
of their local government or private school as well – public schools, private
schools, elite residential boarding schools, and so on.
What follows is an attempt to illuminate these rather diverse patterns of reli-
gious education in greater detail, first in Pakistan and then in Bangladesh.
Who Studies Where? Pakistan
Throughout South Asia, the number of children enrolled full-time (that is,
exclusively) in the context of their local madrasa remains extremely small.
Fortunately, two studies sponsored by the World Bank have drawn attention
to separate-but-related aspects of this fact. Both were completed by Tahir
Andrabi, Jishnu Das and Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and both sought to shed new
light on the shape of the existing educational enrolments (religious and
non-religious) in Pakistan.
The first study, completed in 2005, drew attention to the fact that full-time
residential enrolments in the context of Pakistani madrasas are much smaller
than many were previously inclined to expect, amounting to less than 1 per
cent of the total student population (see Andrabi et al., 2005). In fact, the
research presented below largely reinforces this finding, drawing special atten-
tion to the ways in which, throughout Pakistan, existing enrolment patterns in
the context of local religious schools (for example, local maktabs and
madrasas) are not ‘full-time’ patterns but rather ‘part-time’ patterns.
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The second study, completed in 2006, moved away from the question of
religious education to show that a growing number of children – including
poor children – had begun to receive their ‘non-religious’ education in the
context of local private schools (see Andrabi et al., 2006). Whereas the first
study sought to show that most children do not receive a madrasa-based ‘reli-
gious’ education (exclusively), but rather some type of ‘mixed’ education, the
second study sought to flesh out the second half of the same equation:
madrasa-based religious education . . . mixed with what?
Here, Andrabi and his colleagues drew attention to the parameters of a
gradual shift away from local government schools toward local private
schools. And, again, the research presented below largely bears this out,
drawing attention to the fact that, throughout Pakistan, parents are faced
with three basic options for their children’s ‘mixed’ (religious/non-religious)
education, and, within these three options, a growing number have chosen to
reject Option B – that is, government schools (below) – in favour of some
combination of Options A and C.
A B C
maktab/madrasa government school private school
What Andrabi and his colleagues sought to highlight was, of course, the
expanding role of ‘market forces’ in the context of local school ‘choices’
and, within this, the underlying importance of local consumer ‘demands’
(see Nelson, 2006; see also Government of Pakistan, 2006: 28–29). These
demands are neither exclusively secular nor exclusively religious. On the
contrary, as my own previous work has shown in some detail, these
demands represent an increasingly common ‘hybrid’.
In Pakistan, this hybrid educational space emerges, quite clearly, from an
account of two sets of data – one concerning the nature of existing enrolment
patterns and one concerning the nature of existing curricula. The former was
facilitated, in the context of the research presented here, by a set of more than
300 interviews (N ¼ 331) conducted in eight separate districts throughout
Pakistan during the spring of 2007 (Table 1).2
Within these interviews – approximately 40 interviews per district, strati-
fied in terms of education, income, and sectarian affiliation – three questions
were particularly important. The first asked local parents to explain what sort
of education they sought to provide for their children. Did they seek to provide
a ‘religious’ education (only), a ‘non-religious’ education (only), or a ‘mixed’
education? Approximately 1 per cent of the respondents noted that their chil-
dren did not receive any education at all. But, apart from this – and, of course,
in keeping with the underlying thrust of the argument presented here – 93 per
cent explained that their children were provided with a ‘mixed’ education.
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The second and third questions sought to determine exactly how this mixed
education was constructed, first in terms of ‘religious’ institutions (maktabs,
madrasas, home schooling with local mullahs, and so on) and, second, in
terms of ‘non-religious’ government and private schools. Again, in keeping
with the data presented by Andrabi et al. (2005), our data revealed that only
1.2 per cent of the respondents had boys enrolled in the context of their
local madrasa on a full-time residential basis. (The corresponding figure for
girls was 0.9 per cent.) Another 3–4 per cent, however, had children enrolled
on a full-time non-residential basis (3.3 per cent boys; 3.6 per cent girls),
bringing the total number of those with children enrolled in their local
madrasa on a full-time basis to 4.5 per cent.
The most common category, by far, however, drew attention to those with
children enrolled in their local maktab or madrasa on a part-time basis: 64.5
per cent boys; 57 per cent girls. In fact, when combined with those who chose
to call the local mullah – typically, the mullah from their local madrasa – to
teach their children at home (25.5 per cent boys; 23 per cent girls), part-time
enrolments captured the dominant trend amongst 85–90 per cent of all
respondents.
Initially, turning to the question of ‘non-religious’ public and private school
education, the data revealed that just 1 per cent had sons in enrolled in elite
residential English-medium ‘private’ schools, with the term ‘elite’ referring
Table 1. Pakistan sample
Districts Punjab . . . Lahore, Sialkot, Okara, Jhang
NWFP . . . Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan
Sindh . . . Karachi, Larkana
Household income Less than Rs. 2,499 per month 10.0 (% of the sample)
Rs. 2,500–4,999 26.0
Rs. 5,000–9,999 27.0
Rs. 10,000–19,999 24.0
More than Rs. 20,000 13.0
Education No education at all 13.0 (%)
Religious education (only) 1.5
Some elementary education 26.5
Some intermedicate education 29.0
Some university education 30.0
Sect/Sub-sect Sunni (Deobandi) 32.0 (%)
Sunni (Barelwi) 30.0
Sunni (Ahl-e-Hadith) 4.0
Shi’a (Ithna Ashari) 12.0
Other 2.0
No response 19.0a
aThis ‘no response’ category is tied to those who, in an effort to ‘overcome’ the problem of sec-
tarian difference, said: ‘I am neither Sunni nor Shi’a; I am only Muslim.’
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to schools charging more than Rs. 20,000/month. (The corresponding figure
for daughters was 0.5 per cent.) Another 2 per cent, however, appeared to
enrol their children in elite non-residential English-medium private schools –
2 per cent boys; 2 per cent girls – bringing the total number with children
enrolled in elite English-medium private schools (even in the context of our
comparatively ‘elite’ sample) to roughly 3 per cent. A slightly larger
number chose to enrol their children in ‘mid-range’ English-medium private
schools (10.5 per cent boys; 7 per cent girls) charging Rs. 2,500–19,999/
month. But the largest number, by far, appeared to enrol their children in
the most inexpensive private schools (39 per cent boys; 32 per cent girls) char-
ging Rs. 500–2,499/month (Table 2).
This was, of course, an important discovery. And, for the most part, it
reinforced the data collected by Andrabi and his colleagues from the World
Bank (2006), showing that, throughout Pakistan, private schools were no
longer the exclusive domain of the very rich. And yet, at the level of basic enrol-
ment patterns, the larger trend had become almost impossible to ignore: boys and
girls in Pakistan tend to receive a hybrid (religious/non-religious) education –
one that remains more common for boys than it does for girls, particularly at
the secondary-school level – and yet, increasingly, both boys and girls appear
to receive a hybrid education that attempts to combine (a) the part-time study
of religion with (b) the services of local private schools.
Who Studies Where? Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the situation is similar in many respects – particularly when it
comes to the ‘part-time’ study of religion. But, at the same time, the situation
in Bangladesh also reveals a number of important differences (Table 3).3
The data for this portion of the study emerged from a series of more than
100 personal interviews (N ¼ 122) and, within these interviews, three ques-
tions were (once again) particularly important. The first of these three ques-
tions revealed that most families seek to provide their children with a
‘hybrid’ religious/non-religious education; in fact, 85 per cent of our
sample explained that their children were enrolled in a ‘mix’ of religious
and non-religious schools.
The second and third questions, however, began to reveal exactly how this
hybrid education was constructed – first, in terms of local religious schools,
Table 2. Government v. private school enrolment estimates: Pakistan
Pakistan (boys): 55.5% private v. 33.0% government
Pakistan (girls): 43.0% private v. 31.5% government
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and then in terms of (so-called) ‘non-religious’ schools. Here again, although our
sample was composed of Muslims at a rate of more than 97 per cent (despite the
fact that Bangladesh has a non-Muslimminority population of at least 10–15 per
cent), it emerged that very few of our respondents had any boys (or girls)
enrolled in their local alia (government-sponsored) or qawmi (independent)
madrasa on a full-time basis: 19 per cent boys; 5 per cent girls. In fact, the
most common pattern involved those with children enrolled in their local
maktab or madrasa on a part-time basis: 48 per cent boys; 61 per cent girls.
Indeed, when combined with those who chose to call a local mullah to teach
their children at home (17 per cent boys; 18 per cent girls), part-time religious
enrolments appeared to be associated with nearly 75 per cent of all respondents.
Data regarding non-religious public and private school enrolments emerged
from the Education Watch dataset as outlined in the recent work of Pataporn
Sukontamarn (2006). These sources revealed that, in a significant departure
from the trends prevailing in Pakistan, most of the primary school students
in Bangladesh are still enrolled in local government schools (approximately
68 per cent). In fact, private school enrolments appear to account for just
one in four children, with the most inexpensive private schools – both
English-medium and Bangla-medium – accounting for the largest portion
of this group.
In addition to these inexpensive private schools, however, it is important to
note that, in Bangladesh, many students are enrolled in a set of inexpensive
schools known as ‘informal’ schools (see Sukontamarn, 2006: 5). These
NGO-based schools, accounting for approximately 8 per cent of the total
primary school enrolment in Bangladesh, cater to relatively marginalised
students – for example, working students – with flexible schedules, special-
ised curricula, and, in some cases, extremely innovative teaching materials.4
The basic point, however, lies in realising that, although existing trends in
Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to exhibit broad similarities, particularly
Table 3. Bangladesh sample
Districts Dhaka, Khulna, Rangpur, Chittagong
Household income Less than Tk. 2,499 per month 15.6 (% of the sample)
Tk. 2,500–4,999 30.3
Tk. 5,000–9,999 35.2
Tk. 10,000–19,999 12.3
More than Tk. 20,000 6.6
Education No education 12.3 (%)
Religious education (only) 3.3
Some elementary education 50.4
Some intermediate education 18.0
Some university education 15.5
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when it comes to the expanding reach of local private schools, the current
situation is not identical. In Pakistan, private school enrolments have begun
to outstrip those in local government schools, whereas, in Bangladesh, govern-
ment schools continue to educate a clear majority.
Who Studies What?
The content-based significance of recent efforts to privilege the private sector
and, following on from these efforts, the underlying political significance of
expanding private sector enrolments, particularly in Pakistan, has, however,
been extremely difficult to determine. This difficulty persists because the
underlying terms of the curriculum (as reflected in the use of a particular
set of textbooks) remains almost exactly the same across a wide range of gov-
ernment and private schools. In fact, with the exception of just a few very elite
English-medium private schools focused on GCSE and ‘A-level’ exams, a
closer look reveals that both government and private schools throughout
Pakistan use more or less exactly the same textbooks.
Typically, those with an interest in the implications of existing ‘curricula’
for the content of local ‘politics’ draw attention to the fact that, when it
comes to the question of curricular content, ‘public’ and ‘private’ schools
tend to differ. In fact, scholars routinely go out of their way to note that
some community members shift their affiliation away from the public sector
towards the private sector precisely because they want to provide their chil-
dren with access to an alternative community grounded in an alternative
and, in some sense, a more appealing curriculum (see, for example,
Peshkin, 1986; see also Schneider et al., 2002: 238–260; Smith & Meier,
1995: 64–79). In Pakistan, however, this assumption is not supported by
the evidence. In fact, in Pakistan we seem to encounter a case in which
local efforts to move away from ‘public’ to ‘private sector’ schools cannot
be described in terms of any effort to access alternative curricula. On the con-
trary, as noted above, the curricula in both types of schools tend to remain
almost exactly the same. Indeed the difference, one might argue, between
public and private sector schools in Pakistan is not defined in terms of curri-
cular content (or expressions of community). Instead, it is defined – with only
a few (extremely elite) exceptions – in terms of funding structures, financial
management, and facilities.
Throughout Pakistan, major changes at the level of existing enrolment
patterns (public ! private) have had very little impact when it comes to
specific questions of curricular content. Indeed, increasing private sector
enrolments are important, but the question arises: increasing enrolments for
what? What do students learn?
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This question has received a great deal of attention in the context of local
madrasas. But, in recent years, few have attempted to answer this question in
the context of local government and private schools (exceptions include:
Saigol, 1994; 2000; Ahmad, 2004; Aziz, 2004; Nayyar & Salim, 2004). What
follows is an attempt to correct this imbalance, focusing, specifically, on the
question of public and private sector curricular content as it relates to the ques-
tion of religious education, identity, and intolerance – first in Pakistan and then
in Bangladesh.
Who Studies What? Pakistan
The terms of a given curriculum are, of course, never synonymous with the
content of existing textbooks. In fact, the content of specific textbooks
should never be conflated with a complete account of what students (actually)
learn in school. But, even so, some understanding of local textbooks can
be extremely helpful when it comes to illuminating broad thematic trends
(Government of Pakistan, 2006: 15–16).
In his book, Denizens of Alien Worlds (2004), Tariq Rahman draws a dis-
tinction between three types of schools in Pakistan. These three types of
schools are described (below) as A, B, and C (Figure 1).5 Rahman, for his
part, does not recognize the possibility of significant qualitative variations
within each of these three categories – for example, within Category C: C1,
C2, and C3. But his argument does appear to illuminate several important
distinctions at the level of existing curricula if, one might argue, two rather
specific adjustments are made.
First, the category ‘government school’ (that is, Category B) must be taken
to mean (a) government schools (Category B) and (b) most Urdu and English-
medium private schools (Categories C1 and C2). Indeed, given the fact that
the students enrolled in these schools typically encounter more or less
exactly the same government-sanctioned curricular content (en route to the
same government-sponsored exams) any effort to trace out the pedagogical
(and political) implications of different curricula must be prepared to take
this basic qualitative similarity into account.
Figure 1. A typology of schools in Pakistan
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Second, the category ‘private school’ in Rahman’s analysis must be limited to
the most elite English-medium private schools – that is, those schools that seek
to prepare their students for a series of well-known international exams, the
most important of which are the GCSE and ‘A-level’ exams (Category C3).
If these rather important two adjustments are made, Rahman’s argument
does in fact appear to illuminate important differences between, for instance,
the curricula (and textbooks) used in Category B/C1/C2 and those used in
Category C3 (Figure 2). Indeed, these are the content-based curricular
faultlines that exist in Pakistan today (see Government of Pakistan, 2006:
17, 29).
The differences between these two categories appear on many levels, from
faculty to financial management. But the most important differences are not
limited to questions of faculty or financing. In fact the most important differ-
ences are related to the question of content – particularly when it comes to the
relationship between curricular content and the question of religious or politi-
cal intolerance. Indeed, a closer look reveals that the basic difference between
Category B/C1/C2 and Category C3 appears in the form of radically different
approaches to underlying questions of difference, diversity, and pluralism.
Initially, and without careful reflection, this difference might appear to illu-
minate a case of lower-middle-class ‘intolerance’ (for example in the context
of local government schools) versus the ‘tolerance’ often associated with elite
‘secular’ schools. Research conducted over the course of the last five years,
involving more than 1,000 personal interviews combined with a painstaking
review of several hundred local textbooks, however, reveals that this view
is not entirely correct.6 In fact, the difference between these two groups is
not related to the question of ‘tolerance’ or ‘intolerance’ per se. Instead, it
is related to what might be described as competing approaches to the question
of ‘difference’ itself and, more specifically, competing approaches to the ques-
tion of difference, or pluralism, as it relates to the underlying question of
‘equality’ (see also Nelson, 2008).
In Pakistan, government school students and those from non-elite English-
medium private schools (that is, Category B/C1/C2) are exposed to a notion
Figure 2. Current enrolment trends (B! C2) and curricular options (option 1 v.
option 2) in Pakistan
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of ‘equality’ in which the substance of equality itself is defined in terms of
‘similarity’, ‘homogeneity’, and ‘unity’. ‘If everyone is united/If everyone
is exactly the same’, they’re told, ‘everyone is (by definition) equal’. ‘Hom-
ogeneity’, if you will, is a synonym for ‘equality’.
In fact, as the remainder of this article will explain, this notion of equality-as-
homogeneity is really quite ubiquitous in the context of local government
schools. And for the most part this attachment to the terms of ‘unity’ as ‘con-
formity’ tends to be articulated with specific reference to (a) the unity of
Islam and, in due course, (b) the unity of the nation as a whole. Here, good
Muslims are defined as good citizens, good citizens are defined as good
Muslims, and so on. The unity of Islam, in turn, is not introduced as an
expression of unity that seeks to encompass the extraordinary ‘diversity’ of
God’s creation. Instead, this unity is understood as an expression of unity that
seeks to ‘overcome’ diversity ‘for the sake of the nation’ and, ultimately, ‘for
the sake of the ummah’ as a whole (see, for example, Ahmad, 2004).
Those educated in the most elite English-medium private schools (Category
C3), on the other hand, appear to encounter an entirely different notion of
equality. Here, the terms of equality are not tied up with those of homogeneity,
similarity, or conformity. Instead, the terms of ‘equality’ and those of ‘diver-
sity’ are said to coexist. Different faiths, different interpretations of the same
faith, different ethnicities, different languages, and so on, these become the
components of an explicitly equal citizenship.
Throughout Pakistan, these competing approaches to the question of equal-
ity emerged in two basic forms. The first form was related to what might be
described as an ‘assimilationist’ expression of equality that sought to move
‘beyond diversity’ (as it were) for the sake of the nation and, ultimately, for
the sake of the ummah as a whole.
Equality I e pluribus unum: out ofmany,one CategoryB/C1/C2
But the second referred to an expression of equality in which the terms of
‘diversity’ were regarded as an important (even indispensable) religious and
political norm.
Equality II in uno plures: in one, there are many Category C3
Of course, both approaches exist in Pakistan. But, as a general rule, the
research presented here found that the first approach is far more common.
In fact, far from tying the terms of equality to those of religious, sectarian,
ethnic, or linguistic diversity, the terms of equality (in Pakistan) typically
emerge as a persistent invitation to embrace the terms of one (monolithic) reli-
gious, and political, ‘whole’.
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A. Textbooks in Pakistan (Category B/C1/C2): ‘Out of Many, One’
In their book, The Subtle Subversion: Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan
(2004), A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim draw special attention to this first
face of equality (Equality I, above), both in the context of local government
school curricula and in the context of three sets of textbooks: Islamic
Studies, Pakistan Studies, and Urdu.
Ironically, for those with an interest in the question of religious education as
it relates to the question of religious intolerance, the textbooks written for the
course in Islamic Studies are considerably less interesting than those written
for (a) the social sciences and (b) the humanities – for example, Pakistan
Studies and Urdu. In fact, Pakistan Studies and Urdu deserve special attention,
mostly because, as Nayyar and Salim point out, these are the subjects that
begin to fuse the terms of religion with those of contemporary politics: ‘reli-
gious’ unity as a source of ‘political’ solidarity, ‘religious’ conformity as a
source of ‘national’ harmony, and so on (Ahmad, 2004: 39).
As Nayyar and Salim explain, government-sanctioned Pakistan Studies text-
books for Classes I–V ‘contain 4–5 chapters at the end [of each book] on
“important personalities,” and a majority of these . . . are religious personalities
related to the early history of Islam’. In fact, they explain, ‘these [religious
personalities] ought to be (and usually are) a part of the book on Islamic
Studies’. ‘[But] by including them here [in the Pakistan Studies textbook]’,
they note, ‘all students, irrespective of their religion, are forced to learn Islamiat’
(Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 54). As a matter of fact, turning away from the text-
books prepared for Pakistan Studies to those prepared for Urdu, they explain
that ‘over a quarter of the material in the books used to teach Urdu as a language
is on one [and only one] religion’ (Nayyar & Salim, 2004: vi ). And of course,
that religion is Islam: e pluribus unum/out of many, one (Table 4).
The issue, of course, is not that local government and private schools
include a course entitled Islamic Studies as a mandatory course for all
Muslim students. Nor is it that these government and private schools incorpor-
ate an explicit emphasis on Islam in the syllabus for Pakistan Studies. It is,
rather that, in doing so, existing syllabi tend to conflate the terms of ‘Islam’
with those of ‘citizenship’. And of course, even beyond this, the existing
syllabi tend to conflate these categories in ways that specifically reduce the
scope for legitimate expressions of religious, sectarian, ethnic, or linguistic
diversity. Religion itself, if you will, becomes a proxy for a specific construc-
tion of religious nationalism. And, in due course, religious nationalism
emerges as a relentless push for religious and sectarian homogeneity.
‘It is a Muslim belief’, notes the Pakistan Studies textbook used at the
English-medium Army Public School in Rawalpindi (Class VIII), ‘that the
entire world is divided into two groups on the basis of faith’. On the one
hand, the textbook explains, ‘Muslims throughout the world constitute a
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single nation with respect to their ideologies and beliefs’. And, of course, non-
Muslims are exactly the same: ‘All non-Muslims’, declares the Pakistan
Studies textbook used in Class X, ‘constitute a single [undifferentiated]
nation’.
B. Textbooks in Pakistan (Category C3): ‘In One, There Are Many’
The treatment of religious difference, sectarian diversity, and political plural-
ism is, as Tariq Rahman (2004) pointed out, completely different in the most
elite English-medium private schools (C3). In fact, even as the boys gathered
on the manicured lawns of Lahore’s elite Aitchison College are told that
‘Muslims once prevailed over the world’ because they were inspired to ‘die
in the way of Allah’, these boys are also reminded that ‘there shall be no com-
pulsion in matters of religion’ (Qur’an 2:256/Islamic Studies, Class VIII,
Chapter 12).
Indeed, at Aitchison, lessons regarding the hospitality of the Prophet
Mohammad vis-a`-vis various non-Muslims are repeated again and again –
first in Class VII (Islamic Studies) and then again in Class VIII, at which
point students are also reminded that ‘only persuasion and logic can be used
to show [non-Muslims] . . . that there is no God but Allah’. In fact, in Class
X, the boys at Aitchison go on to encounter a special chapter devoted to the
subject of ‘relations with non-Muslims’, reading that, ‘in an Islamic state, reli-
gious tolerance is so highly regarded that, in safeguarding the rights of non-
Muslims, the state [itself] . . . permits the liberty of maintaining even those
practices which are entirely opposed to Islam’. ‘For example’, their textbook
explains, ‘[non-Muslims] have special permission from the state to manufac-
ture or import alcohol’.
Table 4. Urdu textbooks (Punjab Textbook Board):
Islamic content
Class Lessons % of the total
Class I 4 / 25 16
Class II 22 / 44 50
Class III 23 / 51 45
Class IV 10 / 45 22
Class V 7 / 34 21
Class VI 14 / 46 30
Class VII 16 / 53 30
Class VIII 15 / 46 33
Class IX–X 10 / 68 15
Average 13 / 46 28
Source: Nayyar & Salim (2004: 14, 54–59).
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Even in the context of its unwavering commitment to the underlying values
of Islam, the ‘religion’ curriculum in Pakistan’s most elite English-medium
private schools sees fit to explain that special provisions will remain in
place to preserve the rights of many different people: in uno plures/in one,
there are many.
There is, however, one expression of difference that appears to receive no
attention at all, neither in the textbooks used by local government schools (Cat-
egory B/C1/C2) nor in those used by the most elite private schools (Category
C3). This aspect pertains to the question of sectarianism – by all accounts, the
most important ‘elephant in the living room’ when it comes to the question of
religious education in Pakistan. In fact, as Ali Shan Azhar explains in a recent
report on local textbooks, ‘controversial sect-specific beliefs . . . find not a single
mention in any textbook [of] any [sort] whatsoever’ (2007: 7). Not even the
Pakistan Studies textbook, he writes, sees fit to mention sectarianism or sectar-
ian violence as one of the key challenges confronting Pakistan.7 Although the
terms of religion are constantly invoked (across the curriculum), in other
words, the terms of sectarian difference – indeed, the very possibility of any-
thing even remotely resembling the possibility of difference within the specific
terms of Islam – this is scarcely mentioned (for details, see Nelson, 2008).
Of course, few are inclined to believe that the specific nature of existing
curricula (religious or non-religious) might be responsible for the scourge of
sectarian conflict in Pakistan. On the contrary, most appear to insist that
there is, in every sense, a fundamental disjuncture between (a) the terms of
existing curricula, favouring unity, and (b) the logic of sectarian conflict,
favouring disagreement, division, debate, divergence, and dissent.
There is, however, another assessment of existing curricula and their
relationship with the scourge of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. In fact, this
reading suggests that Pakistan’s relentless push for ‘unity’ (within a single,
monolithic, undifferentiated understanding of Islam) has created a situation
in which each expression of ‘difference’, indeed, each expression of religious
and sectarian ‘diversity’, is regarded with a specific sense of suspicion and,
ultimately, a sense of acute political concern. Indeed, each expression of
difference appears to be regarded as something resembling an intolerable
‘insult’ on at least two levels. On the one hand, for instance, expressions of
religious disagreement appear to be regarded as a specifically religious
insult – in effect, a direct assault on the unity of contemporary (transnational)
Islam. And, yet, at the same time, these expressions emerge as a specifically
political affront to the underlying terms of the state itself – in effect, an
attack on the religious-cum-political solidarity associated with a strong and
assertive Pakistan.
The problem of religious intolerance, in other words, emerges as a problem
closely related to an understanding of religious doctrine in which the terms of
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Islam itself are removed from any specific appreciation for religious, sectar-
ian, ethnic, or linguistic diversity, not only in the context of local madrasas,
but also (and increasingly) in the context of government and private
schools. In fact, a closer look at existing curricula, even in the context of
local government and private schools, reveals that the problem of religious
intolerance in Pakistan – indeed, what amounts to Pakistan’s almost unrelent-
ing commitment to the task, or challenge, of religious-cum-political assimila-
tion – is merely a specific extension of Pakistan’s singular commitment to ‘the
first face of equality’.
Who Studies What? Bangladesh
It would, of course, be impossible to argue that Pakistan is unique in this
regard – on the contrary, the first face of equality has emerged at the very
centre of several (very different) expressions of assimilationist politics
around the world. Having said this, it is important to keep in mind that the situ-
ation in Bangladesh is rather different. In fact, throughout Bangladesh, ‘the
first face of equality’ does not seem to emerge at the expense of the
‘second’. Instead, both faces seem to emerge in roughly equal measure
(Table 5).
One might suspect that, given the enduring importance of government-
sanctioned curricula in Bangladesh, local textbooks might be expected to
exhibit many of the same characteristics as their counterparts in Pakistan.
After all, the dominant textbooks in both countries appears to bear the
burden of significant state control.
As it happens, however, this suspicion does not appear to be supported by
the evidence. In fact, the content of existing government-sanctioned textbooks
in Bangladesh is actually quite different. Whereas in Pakistan, for instance, the
state appears to reject ‘the second face’ of equality (in uno plures) in favour of
the first, the state in Bangladesh does not.
A. Who Studies What (Curriculum)? Bangladesh
Even a cursory glance at the national curriculum in Bangladesh is enough to
reveal that Bangla-medium government schools (and Bangla-medium private
schools) are comfortable with the terms of difference, diversity, and debate.
Religion is of course a mandatory part of the curriculum in every Bangla-
medium school. (In fact, religion is a mandatory part of the curriculum
Table 5. Competing expressions of equality (Bangladesh)
Equality I e pluribus unum: out of many, one Categories B and C
Equality II in uno plures: in one, there are many Categories B and C
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in every formal school – Bangla and English-medium alike.) But, having
said this, pluralism is never ignored. In fact, among the 22 ‘learning objec-
tives’ associated with a standard government-sector primary education in
Bangladesh, as defined by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
(MOPME) (Government of Bangladesh, 2004: 38, 40), four appear to be directly
related to this issue.
The national curriculum, for instance, begins with an expectation that every
government school will seek ‘to instil . . . an absolute trust and faith in [the]
Almighty Allah so that [this faith will] work as a constant source of inspi-
ration’ for every thought and deed. And yet, having said this, the curriculum
goes on to note that each child must be encouraged to develop ‘moral qual-
ities’ through the cultivation of his or her own or ‘respective’ religious instruc-
tion (emphasis added). In other words, the curriculum explains, different kinds
of children must be expected to develop their own moral qualities in different
kinds of ways: in uno plures/in one, there are many.
Even beyond this, however, the curriculum goes on to note that each school
should seek ‘to arouse in the mind of [each] learner a sense of love, respect,
equality, fellow-feeling, and cooperation [for] all, irrespective of nationality,
religion, caste, or [gender]’. And, finally, as if to drive this point home even
further, the curriculum expects each child ‘[to] practise tolerance [toward]
others’ opinions’ in order to cultivate an appreciation for ‘democratic’
norms and rules.
Clearly, ‘the second face of equality’ is not unfamiliar in Bangladesh. In
fact, following on from these 22 ‘learning objectives’, MOPME identifies
what it calls 50 ‘terminal competencies’. And, here again, the link between
religious education and the ‘second face’ of equality becomes almost imposs-
ible to ignore. First, children are expected to combine an ‘absolute trust and
faith in the Almighty Allah’ (competency 1) so that they may remember to
thankHim in all of their activities (competency 2). And, then, with this in mind,
each student is expected to know about his or her own Holy Scriptures so that,
in due course, he or she might acquire specific qualities of moral and personal
character by following the instructions of his or her own religious tradition
(competency 4). In addition, each student is expected to be aware of his or
her own rights and the rights of others (competency 9), to allow others to
express their opinions while showing respect for these opinions (competency
10), and, in due course, to develop a liberal attitude towards the culture of
various countries in order to acquire an abiding appreciation for the spirit
of world peace (competency 21).
Again, the point is clear. The unique status of Islam is simply taken for
granted. But, at the same time, the terms of human diversity (including reli-
gious, sectarian, and ethnic diversity) are regarded as historically and politi-
cally indispensable.
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B. Who Studies What (Curriculum)? Bangladesh v. Pakistan
In many ways, the differences between Pakistan and Bangladesh appear on at
least two levels – one concerning the question of pluralism and one concern-
ing the status of religion as ‘a separate subject’ within the curriculum as a
whole.
First, it is important to reiterate the fact that, throughout Pakistan, the cur-
riculum itself rarely allows for any mention of local differences – differences
of religion, differences of religious interpretation, differences of race, ethni-
city, language, or custom. In fact, throughout Pakistan, the curriculum
scarcely begins to acknowledge even so much as the possibility of difference,
noting that, in each local school, ‘The Ideology of Pakistan’ should be
presented as ‘an accepted reality’ that is ‘never subjected to discussion or
dispute’. In Bangladesh, however, students are encouraged ‘to practise toler-
ance toward others’ opinions’ in order to cultivate an appreciation for ‘demo-
cratic’ norms and rules (Urdu Curriculum Classes I–V, 1995, quoted in
Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 41; see also Urdu Curriculum Classes IV–V, 2002,
quoted in Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 3; Government of Bangladesh, 2004: 38).
In Pakistan, theUrdu curriculum (2002, quoted in Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 11)
urges teachers to cultivate an appreciation for the ways in which every student
(Muslim and non-Muslim alike) is ‘a member of a Muslim nation’, noting that,
‘in accordance with the Islamic tradition’, each student should be ‘honest,
patriotic, and janbaz mujahid [that is, life-sacrificing in a specifically religious
sense]’. In addition, each student is instructed to remember that ‘[the] national
culture is not the local culture (or local customs)’, but rather the culture and the
principles laid down by the specific terms of ‘Islam’ (quoted in Nayyar & Salim,
2004: 12).
In Bangladesh, on the other hand, those enrolled in local government
schools are told, on the very first page of their very first social science textbook
(Class I) that ‘all of us belong to one nation, and our nationality is Bangladeshi’.
And, ‘as a nation’, they are told, ‘we are all united’. And, yet, in Class III,
government-sanctioned Bangla-medium textbooks go on to stress the fact
that ‘people of many different religions live in our country’. Muslims visit
the ‘mosque’, Hindus visit the ‘temple’, Buddhists visit the ‘pagoda’, Christians
the ‘church’, and so on (Class III NCTB Environmental [and Social] Studies
Textbook: 9, 13).
As one respondent pointed out, the tone regarding religious minorities in
Bangladesh is ‘occasionally derogatory’. As a matter of fact, he noted, the
tone often becomes somewhat patronising whenever the focus shifts away
from the specific terms of Islam. Having said this, however, he went on to
explain that the fact of diversity – indeed, the fact of diversity as a fact of reli-
gious (and political) life – is never ignored. On the contrary, even religious
diversity is accepted as a common, and persistent, Bangladeshi ‘national’ norm.
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Second, turning away from the question of religious diversity to the role of
religion as ‘a separate subject’ within the curriculum as a whole, Nayyar and
Salim (2004: 41) explain that the curriculum in Pakistan was designed ‘in
keeping with the philosophy . . . of one particular school of Islamic
thought’, namely, that of the (modernist) Jama’at-e-Islami, which holds that
every subject is, for all intents and purposes, an extension of religion. In
fact, recalling the work of Syed Abul ‘ala Maududi, the founder of the
Jama’at-e-Islami, the provincial curricula for Classes I–V (1995, quoted in
Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 10) clearly state that, across the board, ‘no concept
of [any] separation between the worldly and the religious [should] be
given’. Instead, they explain, ‘all the material [should] be presented from
the Islamic point of view’.
In Bangladesh, however, the reach of the Jama’at-e-Islami appears to be some-
what less extensive – notwithstanding a similar history of (rather anaemic) elec-
toral performance. To be sure, occasional references to Islam – Islam as the
religion of the demographic majority, Islam as an important feature of the
national culture, Islam as a marker of religious (or political) identity – are not
uncommon in the textbooks of Bangladesh. But the history of Bangladesh (as
a nation) is not presented as a singular ‘Islamic’ history. The Bangla language
is not presented as an exclusively ‘Islamic’ language. And so on.
In Pakistan, the curriculum has been deliberately, and deeply, Islamised. The
Pakistan Studies curriculum (2002, cited in Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 13), for
instance, does not urge students to learn about the festivals enjoyed by local
Hindus or Sikhs. Instead, it urges all students – Muslim and non-Muslim alike
– to ‘participate in salat ba jamat’ (communal prayers)’, to ‘inculcate an unflinch-
ing love for Islam [and, thus,] a strong sense of national cohesion’ (Nayyar &
Salim, 2004: 31) and, at the same time, to develop an understanding of the ways
in which ‘all of the Muslims in the world belong to one community’ (Nayyar &
Salim, 2004: 27). And, of course, the Urdu curriculum (1995, quoted in Nayyar
& Salim, 2004: 44, 13, 14) expects them ‘to regard Islamic ways as the best
of all’, ‘to be proud of the Islamic way of life’ and, ultimately, to appreciate ‘the
unity of the Islamic world’. Unity, homogeneity, conformity, similarity, and
consensus: e pluribus unum/out of many, one.
What Next?
Some insist that, over the course of the past 30 years, religious parties like the
Jama’at-e-Islami have been at the forefront of a two-pronged attack on the
existing educational landscape in South Asia (see Mercer et al., 2005: 49).
On the one hand, these groups are accused of seeking to bolster the study of
Islam in the context of local government schools, bringing the terms of a
modern ‘religious’ education into every ‘non-religious’ school. On the
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other hand, however, these groups are often said to emerge at the cutting edge
of existing madrasa-based reforms, seeking to ensure that local madrasas are
modernised or ‘mainstreamed’ in ways that allow more time for the study of
English, more time for the study of mathematics, more time for the study of
chemistry, computer science, and so on (see Candland, 2005). But the
Jama’at-e-Islami rarely shies away from these accusations. Instead, the
Jama’at readily admits that both accusations are entirely correct.
Still, the goals of the Jama’at are not exceptional. In fact, like the Jama’at,
many local parents have begun to crave a more coherent balance between the
‘religious’ and the ‘non-religious’ portions of their children’s education.
Indeed, many even go so far as to say that ‘one system’ providing ‘both
types’ of education would amount to ‘the perfect solution’. One system for
everyone (rich, poor, etc.); one system for everything (religious, non-religious,
and so on) (see Government of Pakistan, 2006: 16, 23).
In Bangladesh, one Jama’at-affiliated school in particular has rushed to the
forefront of this understanding. This school is known as ‘Manarat’. Its curricu-
lum is pitched as a religious curriculum, its language of instruction is English,
and its fee structure appears to lend prestige without, at the same time, becom-
ing completely inaccessible. The textbooks, in turn, are drawn from several
different parts of the world – history from the UK, science from Singapore,
Islamiat from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. And, yet, insofar as the curricu-
lum at Manarat attempts to strike a more effective balance between the ‘reli-
gious’ (R) and the ‘non-religious’ (NR) dimensions of a modern Muslim
education, the emphasis is clearly, and consistently, on religion. At Manarat,
religion is not treated as a separate subject. Instead, religion is treated as a com-
prehensive way of life. From Islamic Studies to biology, chemistry to civics,
and Bangla to English, the emphasis is on religion.
Even insofar as the curriculum is focused on religion, however, the range of
textbooks is completely different from those used in localmadrasas – both alia
and qawmimadrasas. And yet the range of textbooks is also completely different
from those employed in local government schools. In fact, in many cases, the
textbooks used at Manarat appear to resemble those found in other elite
English-medium private schools – with one exception. This exception emerges
in the case of Islamic Studies. At Manarat, neither the government-sanctioned
Figure 3. An expanded typology of schools in Bangladesh
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Islamic Studies textbooks nor the series developed by Yasmeen Murshad
(commonly used in local private schools) is ever used; instead, Manarat relies
on a series drawn from several different parts of South Asia – from India, the
series developed by Abidullah Al-Ansari Ghazi and Tasneem Khatun Ghazi
(Class I, Class V, Class VIII); from Bangladesh, the work of Alhaj Mohammad
Hossain (Class III); and, in its capstone course, a work from Pakistan, the work
of Farkhanda Noor Mohammad (Class X).
Needless to say, the significance of this Jama’at-based model does not lie in
the fact that it is, somehow, new or unique. On the contrary, similar schools
have existed in other parts of the Muslim world for decades (see Damis,
1974). In fact, the significance of this model lies in a number of rather specific
questions regarding its ‘content’ and, more specifically, for those with an
interest in the future of religious education as this relates to the problem of
religious and political intolerance, the status of this model vis-a`-vis the
competing faces of ‘equality’ mentioned above.
If the Manarat Model begins to embrace the second face of equality (Equal-
ity II) – not only in religious terms, but also (and perhaps more importantly) in
sectarian terms – the replication of this model in other parts of the region
could amount to a renewed appreciation for the politics of pluralism even
within the specific terms of Islam. If, on the other hand, the Manarat Model
appears to shun this second face of equality in favour of the first (Equality
I), this model could emerge as a source of considerable intolerance – and,
for those with an interest in the politics of pluralism, a source of some concern.
Conclusion
In December 2006, the Government of Pakistan issued a White Paper entitled,
simply, ‘Education in Pakistan’. This paper noted that, over the course of the last
50 years, the education system in Pakistan ‘has not contributed to [the develop-
ment of] a social psyche willing to listen to others’. Nor has it contributed to the
creation of ‘a tolerant society respectful of the beliefs [and] needs . . . of all’ (see
Government of Pakistan, 2006: 54). In fact, the paper noted, ‘faith has degener-
ated into dogma’ and, increasingly, ‘a commitment to [religious] ideas has
degenerated into obduracy’ (see Government of Pakistan, 2006: 52).
With this in mind, the paper set out to clarify the trajectory of future reforms,
focusing, specifically, on the ‘religious’ side of a modern ‘non-religious’ (gov-
ernment-sanctioned) education. In doing so, however, the paper merely reiter-
ated many of the issues addressed in the context of this article. In particular,
it drew attention to many of the lingering tensions, or points of friction,
surrounding the ‘two faces of equality’ mentioned above.
Not surprisingly, the White Paper began with a reminder that, in Pakistan,
‘the ideological base that governs the life of the majority is Islam’. And the
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paper went on to note that, ‘[insofar as] Islam is the ideological base of
Pakistani society . . . this ideology must determine the education policy [of the
state as a whole]’ (Government of Pakistan, 2006: 51).8 At the same time,
however, having recognised the enduring importance of Islam, the paper went
out of its way to explain that ‘Islam [itself] cannot continue to be treated as a
static religious dogma thriving on ignorance and nostalgia’ (Government of
Pakistan, 2006: 3). On the contrary, the authors argued that, properly understood,
the fundamentals of Islam encourage neither religious ‘dogma’ nor any form
of intellectual or political ‘stagnation’; they encourage, instead, what the
paper – drawing on the philosophical work of Mohammad Allama Iqbal
(1934) – referred to as a process of continuing ‘interpretation’ inspired by
‘the spirit of ijtehad’ (Government of Pakistan, 2006: 3; see also Iqbal, 1934).
Even as the paper sought to maintain a specific focus on the enduring import-
ance of Islam the authors went out of their way to stress the need for a more
progressive and dynamic education system – one that might begin to engage
each student as a ‘pro-active’ thinker committed to certain ‘moral values’
while, at the same time, remaining ‘open to new ideas’, and ‘able to tolerate
(and value) differences of opinion, faith, and culture’ (Government of Paki-
stan, 2006: 4). In effect, the authors argued, the focus of any future reform
initiative must involve an effort to construct what might be called ‘a reli-
gious-cum-political education’ tied to ‘the second face of equality’ (Ibid.: 47).
Unfortunately, scholars and policy makers often disagree about the extent to
which the terms of a modern ‘religious’ education should be joined to, or separ-
ated from, the terms of modern democratic ‘citizenship’ (see, for example,
D.G.L., 1985; Sacken, 1988; McDonough, 1998). In fact, more often than not,
this issue is treated as a simple choice: separation v. non-separation. In the
context of Pakistan and Bangladesh, however, every indication seems to point
to a third option as well – one that the White Paper issued by the Government
of Pakistan consistently seemed to stress. This third option begins to move
beyond the question of ‘separation’ towards the views of Mohammad Allama
Iqbal, who, like Maududi, believed that the underlying terms of ‘religion’
could be used to reinforce the terms of modern (twentieth-century) ‘citizenship’.
Whereas Maududi sought to tie the terms of ‘non-separation’ to the ‘first
face’ of equality, however, Iqbal remained firmly committed, throughout his
career, to the ‘second: in uno plures/in one, there are many. In fact, in
keeping with what might be described as a consistently ‘democratic’ reading
of modern Muslim citizenship, Iqbal sought to fuse the terms of a modern reli-
gious education with an abiding appreciation for modern democratic pluralism.
In its recent White Paper, the Government of Pakistan (2006: 2) alludes to
this alternative, sometimes quite explicitly. But the burden of the past is
heavy, and, moving forward, any effort to replace the legacy of Maududi
(e pluribus unum) with that of Iqbal (in uno plures) will require an enormous
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effort.9 The challenge, however, does not lie in avoiding (or eradicating) the
‘religious’ side of a modern ‘non-religious’ education. No, the challenge
lies in looking for new ways to understand ‘the second face of equality’
within that religious education – not only in Pakistan, or Bangladesh, but
around the world. Scholars like Iqbal have gone to great lengths to lead the
way, providing scholars and policy makers with the language they need to
proceed (see Iqbal, 1934; see also Rahman, 1982). It remains to be seen
whether policy makers in Pakistan choose to take up this alternative.
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Notes
1. Some analysts insist upon excluding ‘part-time’ enrolments. ‘In the first instance’, noted
the European Commission, ‘exaggerated’ enrolment figures will include ‘not only those
religious education institutions which cater to Grade 1–16 students, . . . but also the many
thousands of maktabs attached to local mosques’. ‘In the second instance’, they
explained, ‘exaggerated’ numbers will include ‘not only full-time students who do not
go to any other type of school, but also those students who [visit their local maktab]
for only a couple of hours a day . . . and those who attend primary or secondary
schools during the day [before proceeding] to their local madrasa in the evening’ (see
Mercer et al., 2005: 35).
2. In Pakistan, our sample was strongly biased in favour of male respondents (94 per cent). But
it was also strongly biased in favour of those with higher levels of education (intermediate
education or above: 59 per cent). In fact, competing biaseswithin our sample – for example,
politically ‘conservative’ men v. politically ‘progressive’ educated elites – made for robust
aggregate statistics that, nevertheless, require careful scrutiny.
3. As in Pakistan, the sample in Bangladesh was strongly biased in favour of male respon-
dents (89 per cent). But it was also biased in favour of urban respondents and those with
secondary and higher levels of education (33.5 per cent). The former tend to be somewhat
more ‘conservative’ than the norm; the latter more ‘progressive’.
4. Most of these schools are associated with the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC). In fact, even those without any such association still tend to follow the BRAC
model, particularly when it comes to governance structures, teacher training, financial
management, recruitment, curricula, and textbooks.
5. In Pakistan, each province is charged with the production of its own textbooks, but the
content of these textbooks must be approved by the CurriculumWing of the federal Min-
istry of Education in Islamabad (see Nayyar & Salim, 2004: 5; see also Government of
Pakistan, 2006: 16, 18; and Government of Pakistan, 1976). In Bangladesh, public
sector textbooks are approved by the National Curriculum and Textbook Board
(NCTB) in Dhaka.
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6. These conclusions emerge from (a) more than 1,000 interviews with local parents in Paki-
stan and Bangladesh, (b) a careful reading of several hundred local textbooks, (c) conver-
sations with members of the Federal Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) in
Islamabad, and (d) conversations with members of the National Curriculum and Textbook
Board (NCTB) in Dhaka. Data collected in the context of these interviews have appeared
in Nelson (2006, 2008). The data presented in this article were drawn from the 453 inter-
views mentioned above: Pakistan (N ¼ 331); Bangladesh (N ¼ 122).
7. While the Karbala episode leading to the martyrdom of Imam Hussain is ‘frequently pre-
sent[ed]’, Azhar notes that this episode is never recounted with any specific reference to
the emergence of Shi’ism or the present Sunni-Shi’a rift. And of course, he explains, ‘the
Ahmedi question . . . finds no favour whatsoever with any of the curriculum specialists.’ It
is, in fact, never mentioned (see Azhar, 7).
8. Among its list of Policy Recommendations, the White Paper notes that, ‘between Classes
I and V, it should be the purpose of [the] education [system] to inculcate in the child the
Muslim value system’ (Government of Pakistan, 2006: 53).
9. In many ways, the frustrations encountered by Professor Fazlur Rahman as Special
Advisor for Education under President (General) Ayub Khan (1961–68) should serve
as a telling indication of the challenges that lie ahead.
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